Comp. by: THAMIZHVEL V Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 1988 Title Name: EQLR Date:26/1/13 Time:00:05:30 Page Number: 1 1 O 2 Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values 3 Jason Raibley 4 Philosophy Department, California State 5 University,Long Beach, Long Beach, CA, USA 6 Synonyms 7 Objective/subjective distinction 8 Definition 9 In general, evaluative facts (e.g., the fact that 10 knowledge is good, the fact that stealing 11 is wrong) are called objective if they obtain 12 independently of the beliefs and other attitudes 13 (e.g., desires, approvals, hopes, wishes, fears, 14 likings) of subjects. By contrast, evaluative facts 15 are subjective if they depend for their existence 16 on the beliefs or attitudes of subjects. 17 Description 18 The objective/subjective distinction is deployed 19 in several related ways within the philosophical 20 and psychological literature on welfare, 21 ▶well-being, ▶ happiness, prudential value, 22 and ▶ quality of life (hereafter, "welfare"). 23 There is controversy about whether the welfare 24 of human beings and other sentient creatures is 25 itself objectively or subjectively good. More 26prominently, there is a debate about whether the 27true theory of welfare treats welfare as objective 28or subjective. There is also considerable contro29versy concerning what makes theories objective 30and subjective in the first place. 31Objectivity and Subjectivity in Value Theory 32In general, evaluative facts (e.g., the fact that 33knowledge is good, the fact that stealing 34is wrong) are called objective if they obtain 35independently of the beliefs and other attitudes 36(e.g., desires, approvals, hopes, wishes, fears, 37likings) of subjects. By contrast, evaluative 38facts are subjective if they depend for their 39existence on the beliefs or attitudes of subjects. 40For example, if knowledge is good simply in and 41of itself, irrespective of whether people actually 42do or would desire it, then the fact that knowledge 43is good is objective – or equivalently, knowledge 44is an objective good or value. By contrast, if what 45makes stealing wrong is that certain people do 46or would disapprove of it, then the relevant 47evaluative fact is subjective – or equivalently, 48stealing is subjectively bad. 49Historically important ▶ ethicists can be 50classified as objectivists or subjectivists 51depending on whether they hold that the most 52important and fundamental evaluative facts are 53objective or subjective. Plato, Aristotle, Henry 54Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross are 55usually classified as objectivists. Moore in 56particular appears to hold a very strong form of 57objectivism according to which evaluative facts 58obtain independently of the very existence of A.C. Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life Research, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5, # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Comp. by: THAMIZHVEL V Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 1988 Title Name: EQLR Date:26/1/13 Time:00:05:30 Page Number: 2 59 creatures with minds or psychologies (Moore, 60 1903). On the other hand, Hume, James, Nietz61 sche, and Dewey are normally classed as subjec62 tivists. For such theorists, value and normative 63 reasons get into the world through the sentiments, 64 reactive attitudes, valuing activities, or purposes 65 of human beings. Other famous ethicists, such as 66 Hobbes, Kant, J. S. Mill, and Rawls, are more 67 difficult to classify, in part because there is con68 troversy about the interpretation of their views 69 and in part because their views combine objective 70 and subjective elements. 71 Objective and Subjective Theories of Welfare 72 Theories of welfare can also be classified as 73 objective or subjective or as hybrids. There is 74 more agreement among welfare theorists about 75 which theories are objective and subjective than 76 about precisely why they count as such. 77 Versions of the Objective List Theory, perfec78 tionism, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum's 79 capabilities approach, Richard Kraut's 80 developmentalism, and Daniel Haybron's self81 fulfillment theory are all objective theories of 82 welfare (see Murphy, 2001, Hurka, 1993, Sen & 83 Nussbaum, 1993Au1 , Kraut 2007, Haybron, 2008). 84 This is because they allow that at least some 85 conditions and activities are directly good for 86 one, whether or not one desires them, enjoys 87 them, takes satisfaction in them, or believes that 88 they are good. Conditions and activities thought 89 to have this status include knowledge, friendship, 90 love, moral virtue, the appreciation of beauty, 91 sensory awareness, mobility, and emotional 92 health. 93 By contrast, desire satisfactionism, 94 preferentism, L. W. Sumner's life satisfactionism, 95 Valerie Tiberius's values-based theory, and Dale 96 Dorsey's judgment subjectivism are subjective 97 theories of welfare (see Feinberg, 1984, Sumner, 98 1996, Tiberius, 2008, Dorsey, 2012). This is 99 because they say that in order for something to be 100 directly good for one, one must desire or prefer or 101 enjoy it, or else derive satisfaction from it, or else 102 believe that it is good. 103 ▶Hedonism is a more controversial case. Fred 104 Feldman's attitudinal hedonism construes the 105 building blocks of welfare as episodes of 106enjoyment taken in propositional objects 107(Feldman, 2004). This form of hedonism resem108bles other forms of subjectivism because it is 109based on personal attitudes; additionally, these 110attitudes may be conceptually linked with desire 111(Heathwood, 2006). However, other forms of 112hedonism construe pleasure as an experiential 113state or a family-resemblance class of such states 114(Crisp, 2005). These resemble the Objective List 115Theory, insofar as they claim that a particular 116experience is good for one, no matter whether 117one desires it, enjoys it, takes satisfaction in it, 118or believes it is good. For this and other reasons, 119some theorists have doubted hedonism's subjec120tivist credentials (Dorsey, 2011, Fletcher, 2012). 121Other theories of welfare count as hybrids 122insofar as they combine objective and subjective 123elements. Of course, looked at in one way, most 124of the objective theories already mentioned are 125hybrids: for most of them allow that ▶ desire 126satisfaction, ▶ pleasure, or aim achievement is 127welfare-enhancing, but insist that other things 128like knowledge and friendship are also welfare129enhancing. Still, these are usually classed as 130objective theories. Paradigmatic hybrid theories, 131by contrast, require that the individual building 132blocks of welfare each have subjective and objec133tive elements. For example, Robert Adams pro134poses that welfare consists in the enjoyment of 135things that are objectively excellent or worth136while (Adams, 1999; cf. also Parfit, 1984; 137Scanlon, 1998; Arneson, 1999; Feldman, 2004; 138Appiah, 2005). Other approaches, while largely 139subjectivist, count as hybrids insofar as they 140claim that the preservation of the systems that 141make conation and goal-directed action possible 142is good for one (Raibley, 2012). 143Before examining the reasons for thinking that 144welfare must be either objective or subjective, let 145us further consider the nature of this distinction. 146Formulating it precisely has proven somewhat 147difficult. 148David Brink writes that "Subjective theories 149of value claim that the components of a valuable 150life consist in or depend importantly on certain of 151the individual's psychological states. . . . By con152trast . . . objective theories of value claim that 153what is intrinsically valuable neither consists in O 2 Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values Comp. by: THAMIZHVEL V Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 1988 Title Name: EQLR Date:26/1/13 Time:00:05:31 Page Number: 3 154 nor depends importantly on such psychological 155 states" (pp. 220–1). One worry with this proposal 156 is that "psychological states" form a broad 157 category. A theory that says that the only 158 welfare goods are knowledge and the 159 appreciation of beauty would effectively say 160 that the valuable life consists in psychological 161 states. But this would not be a characteristically 162 subjective theory. 163 L. W. Sumner has written that, according to 164 subjective theories, having a favorable attitude 165 towards one's life or some of its ingredients is 166 a necessary condition for one's life to be going 167 well for one (Sumner, 1996, p. 38). By contrast, 168 he says, objective theories allow that one could be 169 well-off without favorably regarding one's own 170 life or any of its ingredients (p. 38). Sumner does 171 not provide both necessary and sufficient condi172 tions for subjective theories, so this analysis is at 173 best incomplete. This necessary condition for 174 subjective theories may be approximately cor175 rect. However, it is not entirely clear that one 176 must have favorable attitudes towards the ingre177 dients of one's life to be faring well on some 178 forms of desire satisfactionism and aim 179 achievementism: if one is satisfying one's desires 180 (or getting what one aimed for), it may not matter 181 that one does not enjoy (or is not satisfied with) 182 what one gets. Furthermore, most objective the183 ories that have actually been defended do require, 184 at least for high levels of welfare, that one favor185 ably regard aspects of one's life. 186 Sobel (2009) recommends a different way of 187 distinguishing between objective and subjective 188 theories. He writes: "Subjective accounts of well189 being maintain that one's rationally contingent 190 non-truth-assessable pro-attitudes ground true 191 claims about what is good for one" (p. 336). 192 A problem is that this criterion may not correctly 193 classify versions of life satisfactionism and judg194 ment subjectivism. This is because judgments 195 that one's life is satisfactory or that one is faring 196 well do seem to be truth-apt. Some forms of 197 subjectivism base welfare on truth-assessable 198 pro-attitudes. 199 Dorsey proposes that subjectivism requires 200 that "prudentially valuable states be endorsed by 201 the person for whom these states are valuable" 202(2011); he also writes that "subjectivism [states 203that] a person's evaluative perspective, under the 204right conditions, determines that which is good 205for her, and how good it is for her" (2013, p. 1). 206While these formulations are suggestive and 207plausible, it is a little unclear what endorsement 208and a person's evaluative perspective amount to. 209On account of the difficulties noted in this 210section, there may be no neat and precise way to 211distinguish between objective and subjective the212ories of welfare. Perhaps this is to be expected: as 213Fletcher notes, our taxonomies of welfare theo214ries are interest relative, and so they are not likely 215to reflect perfect joints in nature (Fletcher, 2012). 216Perhaps if some of the building blocks or main 217determinants of welfare are partly constituted by 218pro-attitudes (desires, attitudinal pleasures, lik219ings, values – perhaps also aims and intentions) 220or by judgments of satisfaction or beliefs that 221things are good for one, this is sufficient for 222a theory to be partially subjective. Of course, 223there are hybrid theories that are partially but 224not wholly subjective, insofar as they say that 225the contribution made by the building blocks of 226welfare to the value of one's life depends on the 227objects of one's pro-attitudes. Roughly speaking, 228the more a theory says that one's welfare level 229depends on the objects of one's pro-attitudes – or 230on things besides one's pro-attitudes, judgments, 231and beliefs – the more objective the theory is. 232Is Welfare Objective or Subjective? 233Arguments for welfare's objectivity aim to show 234that subjective theories have unacceptable impli235cations about the welfare of individuals who pur236sue trivial, worthless, masochistic, or immoral 237ends. A person who simply desires – and enjoys – 238scratching an itch, counting blades of grass, or 239knocking down icicles is surely not faring well 240(Plato's Philebus; Rawls, 1971, Kraut, 1994). 241Those who aim for, achieve, and enjoy great 242fame and wealth – or revenge upon their ene243mies – do not seem to benefit proportionally 244(Kraut, 2007). A person who desires and enjoys 245pain, bodily mutilation, and humiliation – and 246gets all these things – is not normally thought to 247be faring well (Carson, 2000; Raibley, 2012). 248Finally, a person who desires and enjoys Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values 3 O Comp. by: THAMIZHVEL V Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 1988 Title Name: EQLR Date:26/1/13 Time:00:05:31 Page Number: 4 249 inflicting harm on others does not appear to be 250 faring especially well. 251 But on the other hand, if a person does not like 252 or enjoy his life – and if he does not get anything 253 that he wanted or set out to achieve – it does not 254 seem that it can plausibly be called a good life for 255 him (cf. Adams, 1999, p. 95). And so it seems that 256 there is also some kernel of truth in the neighbor257 hood of subjectivism. 258 Sumner famously argues that objective theo259 ries of welfare such as the Objective List Theory 260 and perfectionism fail to capture welfare's "char261 acteristically positional or perspectival charac262 ter" (Sumner, 1996, p. 43). He concludes that 263 "subjectivity turns out to be a necessary condition 264 of success in a theory of welfare" (Sumner, 1996, 265 p. 27). 266 Sumner has several arguments for this conclu267 sion. One, which we can call the weak argument, 268 claims that any plausible theory of welfare must 269 "make your well-being depend on your own con270 cerns: the things you care about, attach impor271 tance to, regard as mattering, and so on" (Sumner, 272 1996, p. 42). It is then claimed that objective 273 theories that accord no importance to a subject's 274 hedonic and emotional states, conative attitudes, 275 or judgments of satisfaction cannot tie welfare to 276 one's own concerns in this way. Therefore, such 277 objective theories are unacceptable. This argu278 ment is persuasive, but it merely establishes that 279 pro-attitudes or beliefs of the right sort be 280 included among the direct determinants of wel281 fare. But some objective and hybrid theories do 282 include these states (Arneson, 1999; Adams, 283 2003; Appiah, 2005; Fletcher, 2013). 284 A second argument can also be found in Sum285 ner. The first premise of what we can call the 286 strong argument states the subject relativity of 287 welfare: "the prudential value of my life is its 288 value for me . . ." (p. 42). That is, welfare value 289 is a form of value for a subject, as opposed to for 290 the world or for mankind or for no one in partic291 ular; it has a "characteristically positional or per292 spectival character" (p. 37, p. 43). Since 293 subjective theories of welfare say that welfare is 294 largely or wholly constituted by perspectival atti295 tudes – i.e., attitudes anchored in a subject's per296 spective – they afford the best explanation of this 297fact: "welfare is subject-relative because it is 298subjective" (p. 43). Accordingly, some subjective 299theory of welfare must be true: we could not have 300an account of welfare's nature that made no ref301erence to the subjective experiences of the par302ticular subject. This argument seems 303inconclusive. It might establish that welfare 304does not turn entirely on non-experiential prop305erties of the subject. But whoever held that it did? 306Sumner seems to be claiming that the positional 307or perspectival character of welfare value (the 308fact that it is value for a subject) requires that 309welfare be given a strictly subjective treatment. 310But it is not explained why this is so (Sobel, 3111997). 312Another popular argument for subjectivism 313about welfare turns on the internalism require314ment (Rosati, 1996). This requirement states that, 315if something, x, is good for a subject, S, then 316S must be capable of being motivated to pursue 317or promote x. Peter Railton explains the main 318idea behind this requirement as follows: "[W] 319hat is intrinsically valuable for a person must 320have a connection with what he would find in 321some degree compelling or attractive, at least if 322he were rational and aware" (Railton, 2002, p. 32347). Some reason that if this requirement is true, 324then some version of subjectivism is true. How325ever, the requirement itself is difficult to inter326pret. What precisely is it to "be capable of being 327motivated to pursue or promote" something? 328Additionally, there is a worry that this use of the 329internalism requirement is question-begging, 330because the requirement itself is just subjectivism 331stated in another way. For further discussion of 332these and related issues, see Sarch, 2011. 333Cross-References 334▶Ethics 335▶Eudaimonia 336▶Good Life, Theories of 337▶Happiness 338▶ Preference Satisfaction Theories 339▶Wellbeing, Philosophical Theories of O 4 Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values Comp. by: THAMIZHVEL V Stage: Galleys Chapter No.: 1988 Title Name: EQLR Date:26/1/13 Time:00:05:32 Page Number: 5 340Au2 References 341 Adams, R. M. (1999). Finite and infinite goods. New 342 York: Oxford University Press. 343 Appiah, K. A. (2005). The ethics of identity. Princeton, NJ: 344 Princeton University Press. 345Au3 Arneson, R. (1999). Human flourishing versus desire 346 satisfaction. Social Philosophy and Policy, 16(1), 347 113–142. 348Au4 Brink, D. (1989). Moral realism and the foundations of 349 ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 350 Carson, T. L. (2000). Value and the good life. Notre 351 Dame: Notre Dame University Press. 352 Crisp, R. (2006). Reasons and the good. Oxford, UK: 353 Clarendon. 354 Dorsey, D. (2011). The Hedonist's Dilemma. Journal of 355 Moral Philosophy, 8(2), 173–196. 356Au5 Dorsey, D. (2012). Subjectivism without desire. Philo357 sophical Review, 121(3), 407–442. 358 Feinberg, J. (1984). Harm to others. Oxford, UK: Oxford 359 University Press. 360 Feldman, F. (2004). Pleasure and the good life. Oxford, 361 UK: Clarendon. 362Au6 Fletcher, G. A fresh start for the objective-list theory of 363 well-being. Utilitas. 364 Griffin, J. (1986). Well-being. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. 365 Haybron, D. (2008). The pursuit of unhappiness. Oxford, 366 UK: Clarendon. 367 Heathwood, C. (2006). Desire satisfactionism and hedo368 nism. Philosophical Studies, 128, 539–563. 369Hurka, T. (1993). Perfectionism. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. 370Hurka, T. (2011). The best things in life: A guide to what 371really matters. New York: Oxford University Press. 372Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge, UK: 373Cambridge University Press. 374Murphy, M. C. (2001). Natural law and practical ratio375nality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 376Nussbaum, M., & Sen, A. (Eds.). (1993). The quality of 377life. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. 378 Au7Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford, UK: 379Clarendon. 380Raibley, J. (2012). Health and well-being. Philosophical 381Studies, 161, 4. 382Railton, P. (2002). Facts and values. In Facts, values, and 383norms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 384Rosati, C. (1996). Internalism and the good for a person. 385Ethics, 106, 297–326. 386Sarch, A. (2011). Internalism about a person's good: 387Don't believe it. Philosophical Studies, 154, 161–184. 388Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What do we owe to each other? 389Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 390Press. 391Sobel, D. (1997). On the subjectivity of welfare. Ethics, 392107, 501–508. 393Sobel, D. (2009). Subjectivism and idealization. Ethics, 394119, 336–352. 395Sumner, L. W. (1996). Welfare, happiness, and ethics. 396New York: Oxford University Press. 397Tiberius, V. (2008). The reflective life. New York: Oxford 398University Press. Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values 5 O